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) 
[Sac. No. 6914. In Bank. Feb.l0,1959.] 
GEDDES & SMITH, INC. (a Corporation), Appellant, v. 
SAINT PAUL MERCURY INDEMNITY COMPANY 
(a Corporation), Respondent. 
[1] Insurance-Remedies of Injured Person Against Insurer-De- ' 
fenses.-An insurer that has been notified of an action and 
refuses to defend on the ground that the alleged claim is not 
within the policy coverage is bound by a judgment in the 
action, in the absence of fraud or collusion, as to all material 
findings of fact essential to the judgment of liability of the 
insured, but is not bound as to issues not necessarily adjudi-
eated in the prior action, and can present any defenses not 
inconsistent 'with the judgment agninst the insured. 
[2] Judgments-Res Judicata-Proof of Judgment and Jrla.ttera 
Determined.-Where the court's findings on issues necessarily 
adjudicated in a prior action are the same as the findings in 
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Insurance, § 334(2); [2] Judgments, 
§ 445; [3, 7] Insurance, § 189; [4] Words and Phrases; [5, 6] 
Insurance. § 181. ' 
; 
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the prior action, the findings on such issues are supported by 
the record of the prior judgment, whether it be considered M 
conclusive on those issues or only as presumptive evidence 
thereon. 
Insurance-Risks and Causes of Loss-Indemnity Insurance--
Injury to Property.-Although a property damage liability 
policy had an endorsement excluding liability for "the han-
dling or use of, the existence of any condition in or a warranty 
of goods or products • • • sold • • • by the named insured 
occurring after the insured has relinquished possession thereof 
to others," the specific cancellation of this endorsement by a 
subsequent endorsement did not necessarily provide coverage 
to the extent theretofore excluded, so that damages for breach 
of warranty of doors sold by the insured would be covered, 
where each of the endorsements contained a provision that 
nothing thel'ein would vary, waive or extend any of the 
provisions or limitations of the policy, which specifically cov-
ered damages ''because of injury to or destruction of property, 
including the loss of use thereof, caused by accident," and 
excluded damages because of "injury to or destruction of (1) 
any goods or products ••• sold ••• by the Insured ••• out 
of which the accident arises." 
Words and Phrases-uAccident."-An "accident" is a casualty 
-something out of the usual course of events and which hap-
pens suddenly and unexpectedly and without design of the 
person injured. It includes any event which takes place 
without the foresight or expectation of the person acted 
upon or affected by the event. 
Insurance-Accident Insurance-What Constitutes Accident~ 
-An "accident," as a source and cause of damage to property 
within the terms of an accident policy, is an unexpected, un-
foreseen or undesigned happening or consequence from either 
a known or an unknown cause. 
ld.-Accident Insurance-What Oonstitutes Accident.-Under 
a policy insuring against liability for damages because of 
injury to property caused by accident and specifically cover-
ing doors manufactured and sold by the insured, the damage 
suffered by a building contractor in failing to meet contract 
commitments because of defective aluminum doors puuhased 
from the insured for use in houses constructed by the con-
tractor was "caused by accident" within the meaning of the 
policy where the door failures were unexpected, undesigned 
and unforeseen, were not the result of normal deterioration, 
but occurred long before any properly constructed door might 
be expected to wear out or collapse, and occurred suddenly. 
[5] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Insurllnce, § 404; Am,Jur., Insurance, § 931. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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-----------------------------------------[7] Id.-Risks and Causes of Loss-Indemnity lnsurance-IDjury 
to Property.-Undcr a policy insuring against liability for 
damages "because of injury to or destruction of property," the 
'Word "property" refers to physical or tangible property, not 
good 'Will or a business entity. Any breach of contract may 
harm the business of the injured party and, if sufficiently 
serious, may affect his good will, but BUeh damages are not 
commonly thought of as injuries to or destruction of property 
within the meaning of a public liability insurance policy. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sac-
ramento County. John Quincy Brown, Judge. Reversed 
with directions. 
Action to recover on an insurance policy. J~dgment for 
defendant reversed with directions. 
Riggins, Rossi & Kongsgaard and Clarence N. Riggins for 
Appellant. 
Desmond, McLaughlin & Russell and Jerome M. McLaugh-1 
lin for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment for de-
fendant in an action to recover on an insurance policy issued 
by defendant to California Aluminum Products, Inc., here-
inafter referred to as Aluminum Products. 
Plaintiff, a building contractor, ordered 760 aluminum 
doors, door jambs, and attached hardware from Aluminum 
Products in November, 1950. The doors were to be used in 
76 houses being constructed by plaintiff in the cities of Napa 
and Fairfield. The deliveries of the doors occurred from 
December, 1950, to February, 1951. The doors were kept in 
storage for some time, and plaintiff began to install them in 
May, 1951, and installed all of them within a few months. 
After installation, defects appeared in some of the doors 
within a few days and in others after various periods of time 
ranging up to six months. Some of the doors sagged on their 
hinges and dragged on the floors. Some went out of shape. 
Parts of some of the doors fell out. Some doors could not be 
closed and others that were closed became locked in place 
and could not be opened. Plaintiff notified .Aluminum Prod-
ucts, which undertook to supply other doorI'. Many of the 
Hew doors had the same defects as tIle old. SOllie were found 
[7J See Cal.Jur.2d, Insurance, §~ 506, 509 et seq. 
) 
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damaged when received by plaintiff. Some could not be used 
hecause they were unsuitable; for example, 22 doors Rhipped 
as replacement-bathroom doors wcre equipped with chime, 
and letter drops. Aluminum Products shipped a total of 
2,604 doors before enough suitable doors were obtained, and 
plaintiff was engaged in handling, storing, repairing, remov-
ing and installing doors for over a year. 
In May, 1952, plaintiff brought an action against Aluminum 
Products alleging breach of warranty and negligence. Plain-
tiff alleged that by reason of expenses incurred in removing, 
installing, repairing, storing, and shipping doors, expenses 
incurred in office overhead during the time it was engaged 
in settling disputes arising out of installation of the doors and 
loss of profit, it was damaged in excess of $100,000. Aluminum 
Products notified defendant and asked it to defend the action. 
Defendant refused to do so on the ground that damage to the 
doors was excluded from coverage under the policy issued 
to Aluminum Products. Aluminum Products then undertook 
the defense of the action. It denied the allegations of the 
complaint and filed a cross-complaint for some $8,000 alleged 
to be unpaid on the doors. When that action came on for 
trial, counsel for both parties stipulated findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. Pursuant thereto, the court found that 
the allegations of the complaint were true, that nothing was 
unpaid on the doors, entered judgment on the complaint for 
plaintiff in the sum of $100,000 and costs, and entered judg-
ment against Aluminum Products on the cross-complaint. 
Plaintiff then brought this action against defendant to 
recover the amount of the judgment under the insurance 
policy issued by defendant to Aluminum Products. The 
judgment roll of the prior action was admitted into evidence. 
The policy in question was issued for the period from Kay 
1, 1951, to Kay 1, 1952. Under the terms of the policy 
defendant was obligated to defend any actions against Alumi-
num Products alleging damages within the policy coverage. 
[1] An insurer that has been notified of an action and reo 
fuses to defend on the ground that the alleged claim is not 
within the policy coverage is bound by a judgment in the 
action, in the absence of fraud or collusion, as to all material 
findings of fact essential to the judgment of liability of the 
insured. The insurer is not bound, however, as to issues not 
necessarily adjudicated in the prior action and can still 
present any defenses not inconsistent with the judgment 
) 
) 
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against the insured. (Sawyer v. Sunset MutuaZ Life Ins. 
Co., 8 Ca1.2d 492, 499-501 [66 P.2d 641]; Arltll.'ovich v. 
St. Paul-Mercury Indcm. Co., 150 Cal.App.2d 312, 320-321 
[310 P.2d 461] ; see Rest., Judgments, § 107a, pp. 513-518.) 
[2] Defendant contends that the judgment against Alumi-
'num' Products is onJy presumptive evidence of the matters 
necessarily adjudicated therein because it was a stipulated' 
judgment. This question need not be considered since the 
trial court's findings in the instant case on issues necessarily 
adjudicated in the prior action are the same as the findings 
in the prior action. Thus, t.he findings on sueh issues are 
supported by the record of the prior judgment, whether it 
be considered as conclusive on those issues or only as pre-
sumptive evidence thereon. The is.cmes that defendant liti-
gated in the trial court and that are raised in this appeal 
concern the scope of policy coverage and were not adjudicated 
in the prior action. 
The pertinent provisions of the policy are as follows. Under 
Coverage "C," "Property Damage Liability other than Auto-
mobile," defendant agreed: "To pay on behalf of the Insured 
all sums which the insured shall become obligated to pay by 
reason of the liability imposed upon him by law or contract 
because of injury to or destruction of property, including the 
loss of use thereof, caused by accident." Under "Exclusions" 
it is provided that: ., This Policy does not apply: ... (e) under 
Coverage C, to injury to or destruction of (1) allY goods or 
products ••• sold ••. by the Insured . • . out of which the 
accident arises." Endorsement number 1, effective May I, 
1951, entitled ., Exclusion of Products Liability," provides: 
"It is agreed that the policy does not apply to: (1) the han-
dling or use of, the existence of any condition in or a warranty 
of goods or products • • • sold • • • by the named insured 
occurring after the insured has relinquished posscssion there-
of to others .•• " Endorsement number 4 was executed on 
April 1, 1952, and pl·ovided that retroactive to May 1, 1951, 
the "exclusion of products liability endorsement number 1 is 
cancelled l1at." The policy provides that' it applies to 
accidents taking place during the policy period. 
[3] l'laintiif contends that since endorsement 1 excluded 
liability for any breach of warranty of goods soJd after the 
insured had relinquished possession thereof to others, its 
cancelJation by endorsement 4 must be interpreted as pro-
viding coverage to the extent theretofore excluded, and that 
.) 
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aeeoroing1y damages for breach or warranty in the sale of 
the doors wcrc necessarily covered. There is no merit in this 
contention. Eacll of the endorsements contains the provision: 
"Nothing herein contained shall be held to vary, alter, waive 
or extend any of the terms, conditions, provisions, agreements 
or limitations of the nnderruentioned Policy, other than as 
above stated." Coverage A provides for bodily injury lia-
bility. Coverage C inclndes damages "because of injury to or 
destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof, 
caused by accident." Exclusion (e) excepts "injury to or 
• destruction of (1) any goods or products .•. sold ... by the 
· Insured • . . out of which the accident arises. " En-
dorsement 1 is an additional products liability exclusion. It 
· excludes products liability for damage to property other than 
the products themselves and bodily injuries. It neither in-
creases the coverage nor limits the exclusions otherwise pro-
vided. and its cancellation by its express terms leaves such 
coverage and exclusions fully intact. Accordingly, plaintiff 
cannot recover under the policy unless the damages were 
damages "because of injury to or destruction of property, 
including loss of use thereof, caused by accident," and were 
not damages because of "injury to or destruction of (1) any 
goods or products ••• sold • • . by the Insured . . • out. of 
which the accident arises." 
[4] Defendant contends that there was no injury to or 
destruction of property caused by accident. No all-inclusive 
definition of the word "accident" can be given. It has been 
defined" as 'a casualty-something out of the usual course of 
events and which happens suddenly and unexpectedly and 
without design of the person injured. t (Rock v. TraveZer. 
1m. Co., 172 Cal. 462. 465 [156 P. 1029, L.R.A. 1916E 1196]; 
Richards v. Travelers Ins. Co., 89 Cal. 170, 175 [26 P. 762, 23 
Am.St.Rep. 455].)" (Zuckerman v. Underwriters at LZoyd'., 
42 Cal.2d 460, 473 [267 P.2d 7'17].) It" 'includes any event 
which takes placc without thc fot-csight or expectation of the 
person actcd upon or affected by the event.'" (Richards v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 89 Cal. 170. 176 [26 P. 726. 23 Am.St.Rep. 
455] ; see also Ritchic v. Anchor Casualty Co., 135'Cal.App. 
2d 245, 252-253 [286 P.2d 1000] ; Moore v. Fidel.ity & Cas. 
Co., 140 Ca1.App.2d Supp. 967, 971 [295 P.2d 154].) 
[5] "Accident, as a source and cause of damage to property, 
within the terms of an accident policy, is an unexpected, 
unforeseen, or undesigned happening or consequence from 
) 
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either a known or an unknown cause." (Hauenstein v. Saini 
Paul-Mercury Indcm. Co., 242 Minn. 354 [65 N.W.2d 122, 
126].) [6] The door failures were unexpected, undesigned, 
and unforeseen. They were not the result of normal deteriora-
tion, but occurred long before any properly constructed door 
'might be expected to wear out or collapse. Moreover, they 
occurred suddenly. It bears emphasis that we are concerned, 
not with a series of imperceptible events that finally culmi-
nated in a single tangible harm (c/., CaMdian Radium ct 
Uranium Corp. v. Indemnity 1m. Co., 342 Ill.App. 456 
[97 N.E.2d 132, 139-140]), but with a series of specific events 
each of which manifested itself at an identifiable time and 
each of which caused identifiable harm at the time it occurred. , 
The trial court found that "these defects, in some cases, I 
developed within a few day$ after [the doors] were installed I 
and in some cases as much as six months elapsed after the ' 
doors were installed, but that eventually all the original 760 • 
doors so sold and delivered by the California Aluminum to ' 
plaintiff proved defective and feU apart. That said doors ' 
sagged on their hinges, went out of shape, they dragged on : 
the floors and the inside parts of said doors fell out. That' 
when said doors came apart they would frequently lock them-
selves in place and could not be opened. In other cases doors 
that were closed and locked 'Would faU apart and come open. 
That when the dwelling houses were occupied by purchasers, 
as hereinafter set forth, the occupants would frequently leave 
their premises with the doors closed and locked and on their 
return find the doors had come apart and the houses were 
wide open. That in many cases, by reason of these defects in 
the doors, it was impossible for the occupants to lock the 
doors, or even to close the doors at night. That when tempera-
tures arose in the houses the said doors would also emit noises 
that sounded like the explosion of fire crackers." Thus, al-
though it may have taken many months for all of the doors 
to fail and fan apart, it is clear that each door, when it 
failed, failed suddenly. At one moment it was a usable door, 
at the next it was not. Had the door failure res111ted in direct 
physical injury to the houses, the accidental cause of the harm 
would be obvious, but other harms flowing from the door 
failures were likewise accidental1y caused. Accordingly, the 
crucial issue is which, if any, of these harms were within 
the policy coverage. 
It is not disputed that injury to or destruction of the 
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doors themselves was excluded by exclusion (e). Plaintiff 
contends, however, that both the houses and its business were 
damaged by the door failures. With respect to the houses 
its position is supported by Hauenstein v. Saint Paul-Mercurll 
Indem. Co., 242 Minn. 354 [65 N.W.2d 122]. In that case 
the in.sured sold defective plaster that was used to plaster a 
house. The plastcr shrank and cracked to such an extent 
that it was of no value and had to be removed so that the 
walls and ceilings eould be replac;tered with a different mate-
rial. Injury to the plaster itself was excluded from coverage. 
The court held, however, that injury to the house had 
occurred and was covered under a clause identical with 
Coverage C in the present case. "No one can reasonably con-
tend that the application of a useless plaster, which has to be 
rcmoved before the walls can be properly replastered, does 
not lower the market value of a building. Although the 
injury to the walls and ceilings can be rectified by removal 
of the defective plaster, nevertheless, the presence of the 
defeetive plaster on the walls and ceilings reduced the value 
of the building and constitutl'd property damage. The meas-
ure of damages is the diminution in the market value of the 
building, or the cost of removing tbe defective plaster and 
restoring the building to its former condition plus any loss 
from deprival of use, whichever is the lesser." (68 N.W.2d 
at 125.) In Vol! v. Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp., 50 Cal. 
2d 373 [325 P.2d 987], a case also involving defective plaster, 
we distinguished the Hauenstein case on the ground that in 
the Volf case it was not necessary to remove the defective 
plaster before replastering the house. In the present case, 
however, it was necessary to remove the defective doors before 
they could be replaced, and we see no reason for not following 
the Hauenstein case and permitting recovery for damages 
to the houses according to the rule stated therein. 
[7] Plaintiff's judgment against the insured was not lim-
ited to such damages. In addition to costs of removal of the 
doors and loss of use of the houses, it included the other costs 
of handling the defective doors and their replacements, loss 
of profits, and loss of goodwi11. Plaintiff contends, however, 
that these additional items of damages constituted damages 
10 its busiuess and goodwill and were thert-fore damages 
"because of injury to or de~1ruction of property." We can-
not agree with this contention. 
When coverage C is read in the light of the exclusions 
) 
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applicable thereto, it is clear that the word property refeI'lt~ 
to physical or tangible property. Thus it is such property,·· 
: not goodwill or a business entity, that is ordinarily thought 
of as the subject of usc, and it is to damage to such property 
· that all of the cxclusions are directcd. Any breach of con-
tract may harm the business of the injured party, and if sum-
ciently serious, may affect his goodwill. Such damages, how-
evcr, are not commonly thought of as injuries to or destruc-
· tion of property within the meaning of a public liability 
· insurance policy. Defendant did not undertake to insure 
against all breaches of contract caused by accident. It re-
quired an injury to or destruction of property and excluded 
· injury to or destruction of goods or products sold by the 
insured. The significance of this exclusion would be obvious 
had the defects appeared before any of the doors had been 
installed. In such event it could not be seriously contended 
that an injury to property other than the doors had occurred 
within the meaning of the policy even though plaintiff's in-
ability to use them seriously interfered with its business and 
injured its goodwill. Such damages are no less outside the 
coverage of the policy because there was also damage to the 
houses. 
To summarize, it appears from the specific facts 
found that there was injury to the houses caused by accident 
and that therefore the trial court's conclusion to the contrary 
cannot stand. Since the judgment against Aluminum Prod-
ucts, however, also included additional elements of damages 
not covered by defendant's policy, we cannot grant plaintiff's 
motion to amend the findings and enter judgment for the 
full amount sought in its favor. 
The motion to amend the findings is denied and the judg-
ment is reversed for further proceedings in accord with the 
views herein expressed. 
Gibson, C. J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment and in the majority 
opinion exe~pt the reasoning therein that the case of Voll v. 
Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp., 50 Ca1.2d 373, 377 [325 P.2d 
987], is distinguishable from Hauenstein v. Saint Paul-Mer-
cury Indem. Co., 242l\1illn. 354 [65 N.W.2d 122], relied upon 
in support of the con elusion reached in the case at bar. In 
my opinion the conclusion reached by a majority of this court 
) 
.' 
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in the instant case is inl'ol1sistf'nt with that reached by it in 
the Volf case. In my diR.<;cnting opinion in the Volf case I set 
forth in detail the reasons wIlY the insurance policy there 
involved was ambiguous and why, under the decided cases, 
. \;uc~ ambiguity should be resolved ill favor of the insured. 
I pointed out that the primary fnnction of insurance is to 
insure-to provide full coverage of the indicated risk. Busi-
nessmen are not usually lawyers and in the normal course of 
events must rely on the agents of insurance companies when 
buying insurance. If this court continues to "interpret" 
patently ambiguous and inconsistent clauses in insurance pol-
icies to the detriment of the insured rather than resolving such 
ambiguities in his favor, the door will be opened for still more 
ambiguities and even less insurance coverage for the money 
expended than is presently the case. It is my view that this 
court could, and should, when such an ambiguous policy is 
before it, hold without equivocation that the provisions which 
are confusing and ambiguous as to the liability covered will 
be resolved in favor of the insured. If a few of such forthright 
decisions were rendered by this court in this 1ield it would not 
be long before insurance policies were more clearly and under-
standably written to express the true intent of the parties 
and there would be less litigation involving insurance policies. 
SPENCE, J.-I dissent. 
The policy coverage was limited to "liability imposed ••• 
because of injury to or destruction of property. • • • caused 
'by acciiknt." (Emphasis added.) The trial court found: 
"That it is not true that any of the defects in any of said 
doors or any of the expenses incurred or losses sustained by 
plainti1f was caused by accident." In my opinion this was 
the only 1inding which the trial court could properly have 
made under the undisputed facts. There was no "sudden and 
unexpected" event or anything which happened "suddenly 
and unexpectedly" so as to bring the situation within any 
accepted meaning of the phrase "injury to or destruction of 
property, •.• caused by accident." (Zuck$rman v. Under-
writers at Lloyd's, 42 Ca1.2d 460, 473 [267 P.2d 777] ; Rock v. 
Travelers Ins. 00., 172 Cal. 462, 465 [156 P. 1029, L.R.A . 
. 1916E 1196]; Richards v. TraveZersIns. 00.,89 Cal. 170, 175 
[26 P. 762, 23 Am.St.Rep. 455].) Thus, the effect of the ma-
jority opinion is to convert a so-called public liability policy, 
limited to liability imposed for damage ., caused by accident,' t 
) 
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; into an agreement to indemnify the insured against Uabni~ 
for the insured's failure faithfully to perform its contractuar: 
obligations regardless of the showing of any "accident." oJ I 
In Voll v. Ocean Accident & Quar. Corp., 50 Ca1.2d 373 [325 
P.2d 987], a somewhat similar policy was involved. This 
court found it unnecessary there to determine the scope of . 
the insuring clause using the term "caused by accident,'; 
as the facts clearly brought the situation within one of the : 
exclusionary clauses of the policy. (Ibid, p. 375.) In my opin~ I 
ion, this court could have properly reached the same resulf' 
in the Volf case by holding that the facts did not bring the' 
situation within the plain provisions of the insuring clause.' 
This court there distinguished Hatlenstei1& v. Saint Paul-Mer-
curg Indem. Co., 242 Minn. 354 [65 N.W.2d 122], but in the 
present case, the majority relies upon that case to support its i 
position. I do not believe that the cited case was correctly • 
decided, and therefore I would not follow it. 
The majority opinion also cites and relies upon Ritchie v. 
Anchor Ca81laZtg Co., 135 Cal.App.2d 245 [286 P.2d 10001. 
The policy there was quite similar, insuring against liability 
for damages "caused by accident." The insured sold rancid 
peanut oil which was used by its customer in the manufacture 
of food products. The use of such oil by its customer •• ruined 
all food products in which it was used, and damaged the ma-
chinery employed in the manufacture of same." (P. 252.) 
The court there quoted the approved definition of accident 
as something • r which happens suddenly and unexpectedly" 
(p. 253) and held that the liability of the insured was em-
braced within the terms of the insuring clause. Unlike the 
present case, the use of the rancid peanut oil there" suddenly 
and unexpectedly" caused damage to both the entire mass of 
the food product into which it was mixed and to the machinery 
us~ in the processing. Here, nothing happened "suddenly 
and unexpectedly" and there was no· damage to the houses 
except for the fact that the doors themselves proved to be 
. defective. It is therefore clear that the insured's liability 
was not a liability for damage" caused by accident." 
I 'Would affirm the judgment. 
Shenk, J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
